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10 August 1981

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REMARKS

John -

You asked for some comments on the CSI paper. My understanding was that this group (or actually OPP) was to come up with some alternatives for the CSI which fell between

- full management commitment and participation in the Center's current structure, and
- abolishment.

I don't believe that this paper accurately reflects that charter.

(over)

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DDA Management Staff

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Since [redacted] requested comments, I'd suggest you reply directly to him. (Dianne called everyone requesting a drop copy of the reply.)

Since these recommendations offer no substantial change to CSI (except removal from OTE) we could probably respond as we did last time and add a comment on our position on CSI leaving OTE, and on the Historical Staff joining OPP as well. Our other alternative is simply to state that the paper doesn't meet its charter, and we stand on our past position on CSI.

We can discuss further if you'd like.



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O&M (EXCOM)

DRAFT
5 August 1981The Center for the Study of Intelligence

At the request of the Deputy Director for Administration (DDA), the Executive Committee (EXCOM) met on 9 July to consider the future of the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI).

The Center, founded by DCI Schlesinger in 1975 to provide the Agency with a "mini think-tank" that would provide an atmosphere in which the more vexing issues that confront the Community could be examined objectively and dispassionately and encourage research and writing on the profession of Intelligence, has faltered for lack of management support, stable leadership and the lack of recognition and support from the Agency's rank and file. Administratively as part of the Office of Training and Education (OTE), the Center initially flourished--producing more than 20 original monographs (CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making; The Field Station of the Future; and Clandestinity and Current Intelligence, etc.) and sponsoring more than 25 seminars (The National Tactical Issue, A Consumer's View of Intelligence of Intelligence Analysis, etc.) that themselves resulted in the publication of useful and widely disseminated reports.

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Key to its early success was aggressive and established leadership and the appointment to the Center of Director of Central Intelligence Fellows who undertook research on issues of concern to the Community and to the policy makers. These fellows bespoke the Center to their colleagues, acted as its representatives in Community-wide meetings and participated actively in the seminars and meetings held during their tenure. Once its original director returned to the National Foreign Assessments Center (NFAC), the Center experienced three changes of leadership--one abrupt and two relatively brief with a concomitant disruption of stewardship and continuity. Additionally, the Agency entered a period of administrative change and reorganization and personnel restraints. Administratively and physically removed from the Directorate of Operations (DDO) and NFAC and drawing little support from the Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T), the Center's program languished and the flow of DCI Fellows abated because prospective fellows perceived little if anything that was career enhancing about the program and the concept of DCI Fellows, itself, was overshadowed by the established two years ago of the Exceptional Analysts Program under the DCI's direct aegis.

Aware of these trends but unable to reverse them by winning the kind of support necessary from the DDO, DDS&T and NFAC, the

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Director OTE had concluded reluctantly by the Spring of this year that the Center was expendable and recommended that it be abolished. The Board of Studies of Studies in Intelligence, the Agency's quarterly, disagreed with the recommendation and sought a hearing first with the DDA and then the EXCOM. (With the establishment of the Center in 1975, the editor of Studies was relocated from NFAC or its predecessor and functions as Deputy Director of CSI. The Board, in turn, functions as an advisory group to CSI-- approving research proposals, ratifying the nomination of DCI Fellows, etc.).

// *Next week!*

The Board conceded the merits of the Director OTE's brief, i.e., that the major directorates had not supported the Center by proposing suitable research projects or encouraging a steady flow of qualified Fellows, publicizing CSI's published research or implementing whatever recommendations followed from that research. Nevertheless, it felt that the logic for a Center was as compelling in 1981 as it had been in 1975 and that shorter-term research projects, carefully monitored by the interested components and/or directorate leaderships, would be a windfall for the Agency and the Community. It was this counter argument that the Board sought to place before EXCOM--along with proposals

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for changing its own membership and the character of Studies in Intelligence (both deferred in the event).

The EXCOM had under its purview several papers setting forth the high and low points of the Center and heard Mr. Lehman argue that it required effective leadership, top level support, experienced and qualified officers to serve as Fellows and a visible link to the Agency's decision making process-- perhaps as a research mechanism for the EXCOM's own staff. Not all of the members favored retention of CSI, arguing that its resources, however limited, could better be applied in other endeavors. But Messrs. McMahon, Briggs and Gates felt that the Center should be retained, that it should be employed as a vehicle for asking how the Agency and the Community do their business, facilitating the exchange of ideas among managers and nourishing the development of a body of intelligence literature.

The DDCI underscored his belief that the Agency will need to focus on professionalism as it rebuilds and expands over the next decade and noted that the Community is not overly endowed with facilities or talent to sustain such an effort. He seemed to favor the appointment of senior fellows with ready access to top management as a means of gearing-in the Center to real time issues and ensuring an audience for its product. He asked that the Office of Policy and Planning (OPP) ponder the future of CSI

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and consider, in particular, what options or levels of investment would be required to sustain it at a greater level of productivity.

OPP, in turn, chartered a working group with members drawn from across the several directorates to prepare such a study. The working group had access to the several proposals and issues papers, etc., that had prompted DCI Schlesinger to establish CSI following recommendations from the Management Advisory Group (MAG) that he do so and the 1977 study by Andrew Falkiewicz affirming the validity of the guiding concept while at the same time seeking to reformulate the mission and role of CSI so as to draw on the experience gained in its first two and a half years. The focus of that report, like that of this, was not on CSI's seminar program which all agree allowing for a brief hiatus caused the dispersion of CSI personnel in support of the first running of the Agency's Senior Officer Development Course (SODC) is alive and thriving and recently sponsored a productive evening session with the DCI, DDCI and their principal deputies and working-level officers. Important as it may be, that activity is not central to CSI's charter; equally important it is not now--nor was it in 1977--becalmed, as are CSI's research efforts.

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There is little disagreement about the desirability of fostering the development of a literature of Intelligence. The working group, like Sherman Kent in 1955, feels strongly the lack of a systematic body of knowledge of high intellectual content that would provide the underpinning for a sense of professionalism in the intelligence business which has long since evolved from a mere craft. Needless to say, such a body of literature must be relevant--it must be related to real issues, reflect real decision, encompass the trade-offs between intelligence gaps, tasking, collection and production. With few exceptions, such as those noted earlier, much of CSI's work has lacked such relevance, just as the Center itself has suffered from its separation from top management and the assurance that its working is meaningful to the way the Agency functions. Whether more stable leadership of CSI might have meant a difference is moot; there has not been that kind of enduring direction, nor have the several directors clearly been seen within or without the Agency to enjoy the confidence of and access to senior management. Administratively speaking, there may seem to be a kernel of logic to subordinating CSI to OTE; practically speaking that subordination has meant that the Center has functioned in a vacuum. That the directors of CSI have been subordinated to OTE and physically separated from

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the major directorates has meant in practical terms their divorcement and that of the Center from the arenas where the Agency's real business is conducted, the corridors where the give and take of ideas flourished.

There is no quick payoff to be realized from an entity like CSI. Its goals are oriented to the longer term support of management, i.e., the needs of the profession. To function effectively over time it requires some measure of autonomy, as well, so that it is not seen to be a mere tool to be applied or misapplied in putting out fires. Finally, it must have and be seen to have "support at the highest level."

In the judgment of the working group, CSI's current plight is a compound or mix or lack of mix of all three of the foregoing desiderata.

Candidly, too much of CSI's research has been unrelated to the press of business and its product, however high the quality, has lacked relevancy to harried managers who have turned to staff officers for short term, action oriented studies that might well be accomplished in the Center by officers assigned to it for shorter periods of time. Its research ought to be more closely related to day-to-day issues, to the Agency's and Community's goals, to encompass and reflect both the expertise and divergency of views present across the directorates.

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If it is to have an all-Agency, supra-directorate character then it cannot be part of an office not directly tied to the Director. It must benefit from proximity to senior management--physically and administratively--if it is to be able to attract the kind of energetic and upwardly mobile younger officers who can lend it verve.

At present, the Center lacks focus and it lacks an audience as well. Its members or fellows ought to be privy to the on-going concerns of management and a significant part of their research ought to be geared to meet those concerns. There is to be sure a requirement for histories and postmortems but their preparation ought not to be the purpose of the Center or to drain off energies better applied to anticipating the needs of tomorrow or developing principles for the profession from the lessons of today. In spite of the glare of newspaper exposure and congressional investigation, or perhaps because of both, we have become less open to new ideas, less inclined to test standard operating procedures against changing criteria. What better a means of doing so than a Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Everyone agrees that the Center ought to serve as a "Catalyst." What escaped us to date is a mechanism that would ensure that the Center or something like it "can change the way we do things at the Agency."

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The working group chartered by OPP at the direction of EXCOM believes that such a mechanism can be found and brought into play to accomplish that purpose.

In its deliberations on 9 July, EXCOM reaffirmed the need for CSI or something akin to it. That being so, the working group did not consider disestablishment as one of the options it was to consider; rather, it considered the optimum size of a center, the relationship of its director and members to Agency leadership and its administrative subordination.

CSI currently has four professional positions--that of the director, the deputy director (who serves as editor of Studies in Intelligence and runs the Interdirectorate Seminar as well) a publications officer and a lower grade seminar director or training officer. In addition, there is one full-time clerical assistant and part-time secretary, both seconded from OTE. Moreover, CSI now has one DCI Fellow and provides office space and clerical support to one Exceptional Analyst from DIA. A second Exceptional Analyst is scheduled to arrive in September. The Exceptional Analyst Program is funded by the DCI's Office and managed within the Community Staff which is not prepared to provide either office space or clerical assistance. CSI prudently has done both and the likelihood that it will be called upon to do so in the future must be borne in mind in any allocation of space.

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Four, full-time professional positions probably is the optimum size for the permanent staff of any Center. Four positions make possible the management of the Center's ongoing research, the regular publication of the serials Studies and Contra, (nominally a NFAC publication), the sponsorship of seminars, and the monitoring of the work of at least the DCI Fellows. (Some consideration ought to be given to whether responsibility for the Exceptional Analyst Program should be transferred from the Community Staff which is undergoing reorganization and a change of mission, as well, to the Center). More important than the size of the Center's staff is the access its leadership has to the Seventh Floor. Such access is essential if the Director of the Center and his associates are to work closely with EXCOM members to identify and explore research topics of concern to top management and to be in a position to call upon the best talent available within the Agency to undertake research. Implicit in this, of course, is the idea of more flexible "fellowships," temporary assignments to the Center pegged to the research project, itself, rather than to stated terms of six months or a year.

Access and proximity argue against leaving the Center in the DDA environment and away from Headquarters in OTE, which

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frankly regards CSI as expendable. They also argue against subordinating it to NFAC or the National Intelligence Council (NIC) since neither would afford the Center an all-Agency or Community-wide cast. The latter character might be had by transferring the Center to the Community Staff but such a move would not of itself radically affect other Agencys' perceptions of the Center and its role or result in people from other agencies associating with it. That might better be accomplished by coopting representatives of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, etc., to the Board of Studies, thus imparting a Community-wide character to the journal which is after all published under the Director's imprimatur.

Considerations of access and proximity do argue for placing the Center somewhere within the Office of the Director--within the new Office of Policy and Planning or the Executive Secretariat which oversees the work of the Agency's Historian. Of these two choices, the working group thinks that assigning the Center to the Office of Policy and Planning offers the greater promise of success. (Moreover, while neither function fell within its purview, the group is of the opinion that consideration should

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be given to relocating both the Agency Historian and the Historical Intelligence Collection in OPP, thus bringing together in one place current and historical research in tradecraft together with both classified archives and overt literature).

In sum, then, the working group recommends: (1) the Center for the Study of Intelligence with four professional slots be transferred from OTE to OPP; (2) that its mandate for exploring issues of current concern to Agency management in collaboration with EXCOM be affirmed; (3) that its staff continue to be responsible for the publication of Studies in Intelligence in collaboration with the Board of Studies whose membership gradually be opened to other agencies in the Community and (4) that eventually it be joined by the Historian and the Historical Intelligence Collection.

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